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Abstract: “Revolt in Revolution: Preventing and Promoting Slave Revolt in Revolutionary South 
Carolina” discusses the uses of African American slaves during the Revolutionary War  by both 
American  and British combatants, especially focused on the promised reward of freedom for 
slaves joining either side of the conflict. The main argument of the paper is that: “Both white 
combatants sought to maintain control of African American slaves… and continually forced them 
into subservient military roles, despite the eventual promise of freedom, ultimately circumscribed by the 
victors.” The paper further claims that American promises for emancipation for supportive slaves was 
only as a reaction to British promises and that the conflict, following the Dunmore and Philipsburg 
Proclamations (British proclamations insuring post war emancipation for supportive slaves) was deeper 
than simply maintaining military slave allies in South Carolina.  Instead, the conflict became a battle over 
which white party would define post-war freedom, assuming that slaves were incapable of truly 
understanding what liberty would mean. Primary sources relied upon include personal 
correspondence from American plantation owners and members of the Patriot military, 
statements from British military personnel, legal proceedings and wartime proclamations 
(including the British Dunmore and Philipsburg Proclamations and reactionary decrees made by 
American governmental bodies), and newspaper articles, among other documents from the 
period.  
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On the eve of the American Revolution, a South Carolina planter, Henry Laurens, wrote a 
letter to his brother James explaining that pro-British agitators had alerted  some of his slaves to 
the benefits of joining the cause against the “patriots”: 
 
Negro Slaves… have been taught to exclaim, ‘down with the Americans & their Estates 
will be all free plunder.’… I See it my duty to guard against every thing which may 
happen & to Sound repeated warnings to those who are dearer to me… than my Life.1  
 
Laurens was anxious because a free black itinerant preacher had encouraged slaves to use the 
possibilities that the Revolution provided to gain freedom and property from their owners—by 
joining the British.2 This was a terrifying concept for slave owners, like Henry Laurens, whose 
livelihoods were based entirely on the economic gains made from slave labor. Earlier in the same 
year, Laurens had informed William Manning, a London lawyer, that as South Carolinians were 
delving “deeper & deeper into Warlike preparations,” they expected “Tories & Negro Slaves to 
rise in [their] bowels,” striking blows from within in concert with one another.3  The white South 
Carolina House of Commons noted that “every one that had a Life to lose, were in the most 
sensible Manner shocked at such Danger daily hanging over their Heads.”4 James Madison, 
future president of the United States and a Virginia slave owner, thought that the potential for an 
uprising on the eve of Revolution was the “only part in which [the] Colony [was] vulnerable; and 
                                                          
1  Henry Laurens to James Laurens, 17 August 1776, The Papers of Henry Laurens, ed. South Carolina Historical 
Society, 16 vols. (Columbia: Columbia, Published for the South Carolina Historical Society by the University of 
South Carolina Press, 1968), X, 255-256.      
2  Philip D. Morgan, Slave Counterpoint: Black Culture in the Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake and Low Country, 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 389. 
3  Henry Laurens to William Manning, 27 February 1776, The Papers of Henry Laurens, X, 122-123. 
4  James Oglethorp, Report of the Committee Appointed to Enquire into the Causes of the Disappointment of Success 
in the Late Expedition Against St. Augustine, (Charleston, SC: Walker, Evans, & Cogswell Co., 1887), accessed 31 
March 2014, https://archive.org/details/reportofcommitte00so.     
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if we [American patriots] should be subdued, we shall fall like Achilles by the hand of one that 
knows that secret,” shooting a deadly arrow through the single greatest weakness the Patriots 
faced.5 This weakness, with the capacity to break down American wartime goals and efforts, was 
exposed nowhere more than in South Carolina. 
Charleston, South Carolina was the largest African slave trade hub in the colonies and 
was thus particularly sensitive to the dangers of maintaining slavery within their “bowels.” 
Slaves of African origin made up a majority of South Carolina’s population, prior to the war and 
the specter of slaves gaining some degree of social status had already begun to take shape within 
the city of Charleston.6 Still, Patriot South Carolinians did not believe that slaves were capable of 
acting independently. Instead, they feared that the British would incite them into becoming a 
weapon against Patriots.  
Before the war began, white South Carolinians sporadically feared revolts, but the typical 
pattern included outside agitators. In the Stono Rebellion of 1739, for example, they blamed the 
Spanish in Florida for convincing slaves to rise up en masse against their owners to gain 
freedom.7 The Spanish had offered sanctuary to runaway slaves, and had sometimes sponsored 
raids against the lower south. The British during the revolution could prove to be an even more 
formidable enemy, having a sustained military presence in the colonies. By promising 
emancipation after the war, the British might directly disturb not only social and economic 
                                                          
5  James Madison to William Bradford, 19 June 1775. The Papers of James Madison Digital Edition, ed. J. C. A. 
Stagg (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2010), accessed 23 February 2014, 
http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/JSMN.html. 
6  Morgan, Slave Counterpoint, 96.  
7  Peter H. Wood, Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 through the Stono Rebellion, ed. 
History E-Book Project, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), 308-310, accessed 10 February 2014, 
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.00338.0001.001; Peter Charles Hoffer, Cry Liberty: The Great Stono River Slave 
Rebellion of 1739 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Wood discusses at length correspondence of South 
Carolina’s then governor, William Bull, as well as the proceeds of South Carolina House of Commons in relation to 
the fear that these runaways, believed to be supported along their journey by slaves throughout the colonial Deep 
South, held the potential to incite massive rebellion and provide slaves an escape to Spanish territory.   
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spheres during the war, but the entire future of the colonies. Because the British did not 
necessarily seek to restructure American society by emancipating slaves, instead simply hoping 
to reign in American calls for freedom from Britain, slaves were only a strategic resource toward 
attaining that objective. Additionally, slave freedom would be circumscribed by either victorious party 
as both white combatants felt slaves were incapable of understanding what liberty would actually mean.  
Though the British were able to maintain more radical versions of liberty following the conflict, less 
accountable to dealing with the consequences, the American definition and promise of post-war freedom 
was primarily reactionary and required a much narrower definition. Though widespread insurrection 
never came to fruition, the ever-present fear of slave uprisings influenced the actions of 
American and British military forces in interactions with the slave population in South Carolina 
during the Revolutionary War.  Both white combatants sought to maintain control of African 
American slaves, as revealed in personal correspondence, legal proceedings and wartime 
proclamations, and newspaper articles, and continually forced them into subservient military roles, 
despite the eventual promise of freedom, ultimately circumscribed by the victors.   
 Philip D. Morgan compares suspicions about slave revolt prior to the Revolutionary War 
to “static on an old radio,” ever present in the background but not always acknowledged or 
considered important. 8 However, connected to threats of British incitement during the 
Revolution, this static became unavoidable.  Looking at the war itself, historian Sylvia Frey, 
attributes the fear of slave insurrection to the potential for slaves themselves to take agency in 
claiming their own freedom, acting without any external persuasion.9 However, primary 
evidence counters this conclusion and suggests instead that fear was centered more on white 
                                                          
8 Morgan, Slave Counterpoint, 398; The following sources also discuss pre-war fears of revolt: Ira Berlin, Many 
Thousands Gone: the First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1998), 153; and Wood, Black Majority.  
9  Sylvia R. Frey, Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age (Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 1991). 
4 
 
  
agitation of rebellion, especially when agitators offered freedom as an incentive to lure in slave 
support.  Additionally, historians including Gary B. Nash, Alan Gilbert, and James Walker 
attribute the employment of slaves in the war simply to military necessity for both the British and 
the Americans, when in fact this was only a miniscule part of the reason for slave 
incorporation.10 The true root of the entire situation regarding slave use was the question of 
liberty for the slaves and which white force, the Tories or the Patriots, would be able to define 
what slave freedom would or would not entail, or if it would exist at all, after the war. The 
British began this process by attempting to use the few military resources they felt they had in 
South Carolina to quell Patriot rebellion, baiting South Carolina’s majority to support their cause 
by offering a broad freedom to slaves as payment for military support.  American motivations 
were reactionary, hoping to keep the slaves distracted from taking advantage of wartime chaos to 
seek the freedom offered by the British by promising their own restricted version of liberty in 
exchange for military service. The fear of outside agitation of slave uprising experienced by the 
Americans, and further British exploitation of that fear by offering slaves emancipation as 
recompense of revolt, serve to explain the American closely circumscribed and reactionary 
promise of freedom as the true basis for American involvement with slaves during the war.  
 
 
The fear of and potential for slave revolt was great within South Carolina for a number of 
reasons. The first of these is based in the origins of South Carolina’s slave trade and the 
expansion of rice culture within the colony. Rice was the ideal staple crop for South Carolina and 
                                                          
10  Gary B. Nash, The Forgotten Fifth: African Americans in the Age of Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2006); Alan Gilbert, Black Patriots and Loyalists: Fighting for Emancipation in the War for 
Independence, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012); James W. St G. Walker, The Black Loyalists: The 
Search for a Promised Land in Nova Scotia and Sierra Leone, 1783-1870, (London: Longman, 1976). 
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slaves were an essential element in its success. Many believed, like Samuel Eveleigh, a South 
Carolina merchant, that rice couldn’t “be produced by White people because the Work is too 
laborious, the heat very intent, and the Whites cannot work in the wet …as Negroes do,” 
claiming biological reasons for slave use.11 As Eveleigh suggests, South Carolinian planters 
focused on biological support for using slave labor, but did not attribute intelligence or higher 
understanding of rice agriculture to the slaves. In contrast, historians today claim that familiarity 
with rice culture carried over from Africa was true value of slaves to South Carolina’s 
agriculturally based economy. 12  Despite their vital role as actors in the southern economy, 
Eveleigh’s statement is evidence of the long standing history of South Carolinians, and white 
Americans more generally, to not accredit slaves the ability to think independently of white 
guidance. After the first recorded ship carrying African slaves to South Carolina landed in 1696, 
rice culture and plantation size grew substantially, as did the need for greater amounts of labor.13 
On the eve of Revolution, rice had become South Carolina’s biggest export and enslaved 
Africans its biggest import, leading to the drastic increase in slave population through the 1700s 
to the beginning of the war.  
Between 1700 and 1770, the estimated slave population in South Carolina had increased 
by more than fortyfold to around 82,000 slaves. Slaves composed a majority of South Carolina’s 
population, as much as sixty percent.14  The sheer number of slaves was cause for concern even 
before conflict arose with England. When surveying Charleston in 1763, George Milligan- 
Johnston, a surgeon and British lieutenant serving in the colonies during the period, commented 
                                                          
11  Mr. Samuel Eveleigh to Mr. Martyn, 10 September 1735, Thomas Jefferson Foundation, "Samuel Eveleigh's 
Reasons for Slave Labor," Sea of Liberty, accessed 16 March 2014, http://seaofliberty.org/explore/samuel-eveleighs-
reasons-slave-labor/1109. 
12  Judith A Carney, "From Hands to Tutors: African Expertise in the South Carolina Rice Economy," Agricultural 
History 67, no. 3 (Summer 1993), 1, accessed 12 February 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3744227. 
13  Morgan, Slave Counterpoint, 3; Tables pg. 39. 
14  Ibid, 96.  
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on the great population of enslaved Africans, and noted that “in this Climate [the number of 
slaves] was necessary, but very dangerous… their Number so exceeding the Whites” that 
uprising was really only hemmed in, according to Milligan- Johnson, by another ethnic group: 
Native American Indians. Though Milligan-Johnson and his fellow Englishmen believed that it 
would be “necessary and proper” to “give [the Indians] Corrections,” he recognized that their 
presence was useful: 
 
 it [could] never be our Interest to extirpate [the Indians], or force them from their land 
[as] their land would soon be taken up by runaway Negroes from our Settlements, whole 
Numbers would daily increase, and quickly become more formidable Enemies than 
Indians can ever be, as they speak our Language, and would never be at a Loss for 
Intelligence.15 
 
Though whites slighted slaves’ ability for independent action, they ironically relied on it 
for the cultivation of their estates. The intelligence of slaves was even often utilized within the 
task system on South Carolina’s rice plantations. Unlike cotton or tobacco cultivation, where 
slaves worked in labor groups supervised by white overseers, rice plantations in South Carolina’s 
Low Country maintained a task based system in which the yield could be measured without 
direct interaction with white planters.16 As a result, many of the overseers were black, believed to 
be physically capable of the task, but not capable of using limited power as an impetus to seek 
full autonomy. However, with relative freedom, slaves could often meet the required quota and 
                                                          
15  George Milligan-Johnson, “Observations of Charleston,” (1763), A South Carolina Chronology, 1497-1992; 2nd 
edition, ed. C. Rogers and C. James Taylor, (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1994), 43. 
16  Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: the First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America, (Cambridge: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1998), 153.  
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use the rest of their time for their own purposes. This down time allowed for relationships, and 
conspiracy, outside of white control, which could be dangerous to slave owners, as it proved to 
be in the Stono Rebellion of 1739.  
 In addition to those on backcountry rice plantations in South Carolina, slaves in urban 
areas, specifically Charleston, also had a relative amount of freedom in comparison to other parts 
of colonial America. Along with fulfilling domestic roles, many slaves developed other abilities, 
working as artisans and skilled craftsmen and in some instances were rented out by their owners 
and eventual began to arrange work for themselves, thereby gaining a “near-independent place” 
in Charleston’s economy. However, by the start of the Revolution, South Carolinians had 
vehemently complained that black artisans were taking white jobs, and the governing body of the 
colony passed regulations designed to keep urban slaves in unskilled occupations.17 Yet, skilled 
African Americans continued to appear as a threat to white city dwellers, terrified that a taste of 
freedom would make them hungry for more. In 1770, Charleston’s governor, William Bull, 
wrote in a statement about the colony of South Carolina’s laws that “it has been thought 
dangerous to the public safety to put [Negroes] on a footing of equality in [any] respect with 
their masters, as it might tempt slaves to make resistance.” 18 No example serves to display the 
reality of the belief in this statement more than the 1775 execution of Thomas Jeremiah, a free, 
and wealthy, black boat pilot charged with attempts to incite rebellion, as well as promoting 
alleged plans to set fire to Charleston and being in cahoots with slave runaways.19 Jeremiah 
served as an example of what slaves could aspire to be, emancipated and successful, making him 
                                                          
17  Ibid, 155.  
18  William Bull, “Governor William Bull’s Representation of the Colony, 1770,” quoted in The Colonial South 
Carolina Scene: Contemporary Views, 1697-1774; Tricentenial Edition, no. 7, ed. H. Roy Merrens, (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1977), 260.    
19  Harris, J. William, The Hanging of Thomas Jeremiah: a Free Black Man's Encounter with Liberty, (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2009), 92. 
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the ideal candidate, according to white society, to actively plot with outside enemies to incite the 
slave masses that would otherwise remain docile. The evidence against Jeremiah was 
questionable, especially the great fear that Thomas and others involved in his supposed scheme 
could have served as support for British forces at the start of wartime tensions, piloting their 
ships into Charleston Bay.20 Regardless of their veracity, these charges served to terrify the white 
Carolinians about the likelihood of slave insurrection incited by the British as a war tactic to 
attempt the destruction of Patriot resistance from the inside out.  
It was an accepted truism among slave owners that slaves did not have the mental 
capacity to consider or claim agency in rebelling for emancipation unless coupled with outside, 
white, agitators.  Americans were complacent about slaves owning or possessing weapons up 
until the prospect for slaves to join the British arose.21 Individual planters often found it 
necessary to arm slaves for economic reasons, yet lived in terror that slaves could use these 
weapons to upset social hierarchy. One account in Charleston’s South Carolina Gazette in 1754 
notes that some slaves carrying their master’s firearms “charged and discharged [them] several 
times as they went along the streets to the great Terror of many Ladies,” and it was recorded that 
throughout the colony, many slaves had personal weapons as well, though using them outside of 
white imposed reasons was exceedingly rare.22 While Thomas Jeremiah’s trial went on, rumors 
arose that the new royal governor of South Carolina, William Campbell, was bringing with him 
“fourteen thousand stand of arms to distribute to slaves,”  based on a supposedly intercepted 
letter from an Englishman published in the South Carolina Gazette, though the ship really only 
                                                          
20  Ibid, 98. 
21  Morgan, Slave Counterpoint, 391.  
22  “Account,” South Carolina Gazette, 17 October 1754, The South Carolina Gazette, 1732-1775, ed. Hennig 
Cohen (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1953).  
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contained Campbell’s furniture and personal effects.23 Fears of slave insurrection rose quickly 
when related to British agitation, most of all recalling the potential Spanish connection to the 
Stono Rebellion of the recent past. 
 As a reaction to the Stono Rebellion, a stricter code, the Negro Act of 1740, was put in 
place to prevent future revolt. For example, the Act established that a slave found off of their 
plantation without the proper note from their owners was to be “punished with whipping on the 
bare back.”24 Additionally, the law prohibited black slaves from carrying firearms for any reason 
without written permission and declared that “it is absolutely necessary to the safety of this 
Province, that all due care be taken to restrain the wanderings and meetings of Negroes and other 
slaves, at all times,” terrified most of all by the Spanish connection the rebellion exposed.25 The 
near success of the Stono Rebellion escalated colonial fears of outside agitators encouraging 
rebellion, which stayed constant through the advent of the Revolution, increasing as a new threat, 
the opportunity for slaves to join the British forces, became apparent. 
 
 Unlike Stono, the budding Revolution presented a situation in which the outside agitators, 
the British, had a sustained military presence within the colonies. In 1778, the British moved the 
war south in order to end the stalemate in the North and satisfy mounting pressure for success 
from home. They were hampered by the downsizing of their army due to French entry into the 
war, and their strategy relied more than ever on attracting Loyalist allies, who were presumed to 
                                                          
23  Harris, Hanging, 88. 
24  “A Transcription of the Negro Act of 1740,” The Statutes at Large of South Carolina. Vol. 7, Containing the Acts 
Relating to Charleston, Courts, Slaves, and Rivers, ed. David J. McCord, (Columbia: A.S. Johnston, 1840), 397. 
25  Ibid, 397. 
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be numerous, as well as the support of others, including slaves and Indians.26 In the Northern 
portion of the war, the British had begun to a limited extent to use slaves as support, but not to 
the extent they would in the South.  
British use of slaves as soldiers began in Virginia with promises of freedom for slaves 
after the war as a reward for joining the military. In November 1775, John Murray, better known 
as Lord Dunmore, issued a proclamation that not only threatened that all colonists raising arms 
against the Crown would be seen as traitors, but also declared “all indentured Servants, Negroes, 
or others… free that are able and willing to bear Arms” should join “His MAJESTY’S Troops as 
soon as may be, for the more speedily reducing this Colony to a proper Sense of their Duty… till 
such Time as Peace may be again restored to this at present most unhappy Country, or demanded 
of them for their former salutary Purposes.”27 The Proclamation, though only in effect in 
Virginia, had wide effects on all of the colonies. Though the Proclamation only offered freedom 
to those volunteer slaves whose masters were patriot, emancipation of the entire slave population 
could easily follow. 
 Lord Dunmore’s Proclamation did in fact serve as the blueprint for a later, more all-
encompassing, proclamation made by General Henry Clinton in 1779. Prior to Dunmore’s 
declaration, the majority of South Carolina’s white population classified themselves as Loyalist, 
                                                          
26  Jim Piecuch, Three Peoples, One King: Loyalists, Indians, and Slaves in the Revolutionary South, 1775-1782 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2008), 125; Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the 
Revolution, 1775-1780, (New York, London: New York, The Macmillan Company; London, Macmillan & Co., ltd, 
1901); Walter Edgar, “The South in the American Revolution,” FORA.tv video, 56:29, (lecture, The Society of the 
Cincinnati: Washington, D.C, October 26, 2012), accessed 12 April 2014, 
http://fora.tv/2012/10/26/South_Carolina_and_the_South_in_the_American_Revolution;. The latter two resources 
were used in addition as general reference throughout this paper as to overarching themes and events within the war 
and are referred to in their entirety. 
27  "Lord Dunmore's Proclamation (1775)," Slavery in the United States: A Social, Political, and Historical  
Encyclopedia, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2007), accessed 4 February 2014, http://search.credoreference.com/ 
content/entry/abcslavery/lord_dunmore_s_proclamation_1775/0. 
11 
 
  
but upon hearing of his plan to incite slaves against colonists, most changed their tune, declaring 
their independence from the Crown.28 Clinton was said to have identified America’s hypocritical 
anger over the Proclamation: 
 
He had said… privately, that, since [the Americans] were so anxious for liberty— 
for more freedom than was consistent with the free institutions of the mother-
country and the charter of the Colony— that since they were so eager to abolish a 
fanciful slavery in a dependence on Great Britain, he would try how they liked an 
abolition of real slavery by setting free their Negroes.29 
 
Despite their double standard in regard to “slavery,” Americans, Patriot or even Loyalist, 
regarded Dunmore’s Proclamation as an offensive attack on their personal property, turning them 
against the British. Because of this, the British had to look for outside support aside from the 
many Loyalists turned away from the political position toward neutrality or even siding with the 
Americans.  
As the former Loyalists feared, a similar proclamation to Dunmore’s, which was to 
employ and later emancipate slaves, was soon made to take effect in every colony, including 
South Carolina. This decree, entitled the Phillipsburg Proclamation, was made by General Henry 
Clinton, Commander-in-Chief of Britain’s military forces in North America, in late June, 1779. 
                                                          
28  Gilbert, Black Patriots and Loyalists, 37.    
29  George L. Craik and Charles Macfarlane, The Pictorial History of England being a History of the People, as Well 
as a History of the Kingdom, Vol. 1 (London: C Knight, 1847) 224-225, accessed 26 April 2014, 
https://archive.org/details/pictorialhistor06macfgoog.   
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It called for all enslaved persons to join his forces and “promise[d] every NEGROE who shall 
desert the Rebel Standard full security,” even if they were not serving as soldiers. 30 Though the 
Proclamation was a step toward full emancipation, the total freedom of all slaves in the colonies 
had to be suppressed by the British. Overhearing a conversation between two slaves whose white 
owners were then fleeing Virginia, Henry Melchior Muhlenberg, a politically neutral Lutheran 
preacher, wrote that “They secretly wished that the British army might win, for then all Negro 
slaves (would) earn their freedom,” a dangerous idea that could influence all parties involved, 
British or American.31  
The British, however, did not enter the war seeking to completely restructure American 
society and overturn the successful slave economy of the colonies, but instead were forced to 
appeal to any support they had in order to suppress white colonial uprising. A promise of full 
emancipation would have led to lost support from Loyalist slave owners that had not yet 
abandoned the British cause and were vital to British success. The Proclamation was carefully 
worded so that only those slaves belonging to Patriot supporters who had run away and 
volunteered to serve in the British forces would receive freedom at war’s end, excluding 
“volunteers” from Loyalist plantations (whether they volunteered of their own accord or were 
volunteered by their masters) and those that were taken from their Patriot-owned plantations as 
                                                          
30  “Philipsburg Proclamation Henry Clinton (1779),” quoted in George Livermore, An Historical Research 
Respecting the Opinions of the Founders of the Republic on Negroes as Slaves, as Citizens, and as Soldiers (New 
York: New York, A. M. Kelley, 1970), 136; Livermore’s An Historical Research  is a collection of documents (and 
commentary) originally published in 1863 in order to support the use of African American soldiers in the Civil 
Wars, as well as affirming war aims toward emancipation.                                 
31  Henry Melchior Muhlenberg, The Journals of Henry Melchior Muhlenberg, eds. Theodore G. Tappert and John 
W. Doberstein, 3 vols., (Philadelphia, PA: Evangelical Lutheran Ministerium of Pennsylvania and Adjacent States 
and the Muhlenberg Press, 1942), III, 78.           
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contraband. Contraband slaves were considered spoils of war and property of those who captured 
them, on both the British and American sides of the conflict. 32   
  In late 1778 and into 1779, the British began making gains in the lower South, 
significantly capturing Savannah, Georgia, then continuing northward, gaining black support as 
they went. The British reached South Carolina by 1780 and took Charleston, of key importance 
to their strategic military goals, after a six week siege.  A brutal war of attrition followed and 
interactions with slaves continued to play a major role in the conflict. The majority of the slave 
population, unique to the Southern theater, allowed the British, to a greater extent, to cripple the 
American forces by inciting internal rebellion. However, though they believed that creating black 
military units would be advantageous, many Tories were hesitant to employ slaves, including 
Parliament member and philosopher, Edmund Burke, who condemned “severe strictures on the 
endeavors in two of the southern colonies to excite an insurrection of the negro-slaves against 
their masters.”33  According to the Parliamentary record, Burke argued “in strong colours” that 
“the nature of an insurrection of Negroes [held]… horrible consequences that might ensue from 
constituting 100,000 fierce, barbarian slaves, to be both the judges and executioners of their 
masters.” Burke went on to list possible consequences, even asking how the British would deal 
with governing former slaves, emancipated after serving against the Americans, should they win 
the war. These former slaves, he argued, would “[make] them- selves masters of the houses, 
goods, wives, and daughters of their murdered lords… adding confusion to confusion, and 
destruction to destruction,” echoing the fears of Americans like Henry Laurens.34 Because of this 
                                                          
32  Frey, Water, 121-122.                              
33  Edmund Burke, ""Mr. Burke's Motion Relative to the Military Employment of Indians in the Civil War with 
America, February 6, 1778"," in The Speeches of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, in the House of Commons, 
and in Westminster-Hall, Vol. 1 (London: London, Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1816), 393, accessed 
5 April 2014, https://archive.org/details/speechesrightho00burkgoog.           
34  Ibid, 399. 
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universal fear that affected both white powers, the British were forced to deal carefully in 
promising slaves freedom.  
 Though General Clinton attempted to reign in all out emancipation, many slaves 
presumed themselves free and fled their plantations, or even from supporting the British. Such an 
opportunity for upward mobility that Clinton’s Proclamation suggested had the potential to 
become a way for ill feeling toward their oppressors to take an extreme, even violent, form both 
outside of and within British ranks.35 Though this ultimately did not occur, many African-
Americans serving in the military deserted the British army during the Revolution and fled to 
freedom. In his memoirs, Boston King, a slave who joined the British army during the war, 
explained his experiences in the military and the difficulty of truly attaining the freedom 
promised by Clinton’s Proclamation. While serving under one Captain Grey, King was asked to 
be Grey’s “servant,” even after the war or in the case that Grey disserted. When King showed 
displeasure at Grey’s potential desertion, Grey told King “‘if you [King] do not behave, I will put 
you in irons, and I will give you a dozen stripes every morning.’” This is when King decided that 
his “case was desperate and that [he] had nothing to trust to, but to wait the first opportunity to 
making [his] escape.”36 Though serving in the military promised freedom, ideas of upholding the 
institution of slavery and the societal structure of white supremacy still permeated the British 
forces, causing numerous slaves to attempt escape, and often succeed. The problem was so 
extreme that the army, in order to prevent future runaways and to please Loyalist supporters who 
supplied slaves, attempted to register all black deserters in order to return them to their 
plantations if held by Loyalists.37  Additionally, as it was unprofitable to employ the entire 
                                                          
35  Frey, Water, 119.     
36  Boston King, "The Memoirs of the Life of Boston King, a Black Preacher," The Methodist Magazine, 1798, 105, 
accessed 10 February 2014, http://antislavery.eserver.org/narratives/boston_king/.                               
37  Frey, Water, 119.     
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number of slaves that flocked to the British lines, mostly women and children, who had 
volunteered, Clinton was forced to consider “some scheme for placing those [slaves] we have on 
abandoned plantations on which they may subsist,” which was countered by the fear that many 
slaves, remaining “idle” together could cause uprising from within the ranks of the British 
force.38 Throughout the war, the British had the increasingly difficult task of crippling the 
American South Carolina slave economy, while maintaining food production for their own 
purposes, so many slaves were denied the freedom promised them and returned to plantations to 
attempt this balance.  
Though Americans feared their slaves rising against them if incited, the British were 
fearful of slaves rebelling against their control as well.  The British brought in the slaves deemed 
most capable of organizing an uprising due to physical attributes (rather than intellect) and gave 
them manual labor and non-combat positions, keeping weapons out of their hands and otherwise 
serving as a distraction from mutiny. Additionally, though more out of what they deemed 
“military necessity” than by design, British units focused their efforts on maintaining the health 
of the most essential units of skilled white soldiers while African American units were more 
poorly fed and overworked.39  This made them more susceptible to disease, particularly small 
pox, which was rampant in South Carolina at the time, and weakened them in terms of 
attempting a physical uprising.  The British were less concerned with the intellect required to 
stage a revolt than they were with the potential of being physically overtaken by slaves.40 
 
                                                          
38  Henry Clinton to Charles Cornwallis, 20 May 1780, quoted in Frey, Water, 119. 
39  Frey, Water, 127. 
40  Elizabeth A. Fenn, Pox Americana: The Great Smallpox Epidemic of 1775-82 (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 
2002), 384. 
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 The American Patriots were substantially more terrified of slave revolt during their war 
against Britain, and for good reason. After all, they could not promise the same full freedom at 
the end of the war as the British because the economy of many of the colonies, particularly those 
of Georgia and South Carolina, relied on slave labor. Subtle attempts to prevent slave recoil are 
first evident in the press on the eve of war. As the threat of war with the British grew larger, 
stories related to slave revolt were often used to demonize the British for inciting rebellions. This 
pattern emerged as early as 1776. The Declaration of Independence itself chastised King George 
III for having “excited domestic insurrections among us.”41 Still accounts that referred directly to 
slave agency were rarely put in print, focused instead on the roles of American enemies inciting 
rebellion.42 Though the majority of African Americans could not read, there were a few 
exceptions, like Thomas Jeremiah, who had the potential to spread the word of British promises 
for freedom and inspire more insubordination. James Madison wrote to a friend in 1774, warning 
that talk of even slave revolt attempts “should be concealed as well as suppressed” in the press.43 
Another newspaper printed part of a letter regarding a South Carolina uprising, but “[thought]  it 
prudent to suppress the account,” while still informing the readers that the uprising had been 
successfully quelled and had “reduced [the slaves] to their former submission.”44 Still, keeping 
stories of revolt unpublished in American papers did little to keep slaves from supporting the 
British when the opportunity for emancipation was presented.  
                                                          
41  "The Declaration of Independence: A Transcription," National Archives and Records Administration, Accessed 2 
February 2014, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html; Sidney Kaplan, "The 
"Domestic Insurrections" of the Declaration of Independence," Journal of Negro History 61, no. 3 (1976): 243-255, 
accessed February 2, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2717252. 
42  Bradley, Patricia, Slavery, Propaganda, and the American Revolution, (Jackson, MS: University of Mississippi 
Press, 1998), 132. 
43  James Madison to William Bradford, 26 November 1774, The Papers of James Madison Digital Edition, 
accessed 12 April 2014.   
44  Pennsylvania Packet, 25 December 1775, quoted in Patricia Bradley, Slavery, Propaganda, and the American 
Revolution, 132. 
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The Americans were locked in a paradoxical battle from the start of the Revolutionary 
war, fighting for the self-evident truth that “all men [were] created equal [and]… endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights…[of] Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness,” 
while promoting slavery, the very antithesis of the ideals for which they allegedly were 
fighting.45 The British called attention to this hypocrisy, including the famous statement by Tory 
lawyer, Thomas Day, noting that “If there be an object truly ridiculous in nature, it [was] an 
American patriot, signing resolutions of independency with the one hand, and with the other 
brandishing a whip over his affrighted slaves.”46 The American Patriots were hesitant to employ 
slaves, having nothing to offer greater than the freedom that the British offered. Americans 
hoped to avoid promising emancipation to any potential black soldiers, fearing none would be 
willing to return to servile roles following the war. George Washington voiced his concern, 
arguing that offering freedom in return for service would “render slavery more irksome to those 
who remain in it,” and could lead to calls universal emancipation.47  
Still, others argued that employing slaves would be a necessity, including General 
Nathaniel Greene, who claimed in a letter to George Washington that “to fill up the regiments 
with whites [was] impracticable, and to get reinforcement from the northwards precarious.”48  
Eventually, the state of American military forces and the need for soldiers in South Carolina 
became so desperate that in 1779, the Continental Congress passed a resolution that had been 
strongly advocated for by John Laurens, Henry Laurens’ son.  The resolution called for “the 
                                                          
45  "The Declaration of Independence: A Transcription." 
46  Thomas Day, ""Fragment of an Original Letter on the Slavery of the Negroes, Written in the Year 1776 by 
Thomas Day, Esq."," The Monthly Review Or Literary Journal 71, Art. 46 (1785), 154, accessed 15 April 2014, 
https://archive.org/details/fragmentoforigin00dayt.         
47  George Washington to Henry Laurens, March 1779, in Fritz Hirschfeld, George Washington and Slavery: A 
Documentary Portrayal (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1997), 131.  
48  Nathaniel Greene to George Washington, 24 January 1782, quoted in Livermore, An Historical Research, 148.        
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states of South Carolina and Georgia… to take measures immediately for raising three thousand 
able bodied negroes,” a very limited number in comparison to the entire African American slave 
population, and especially in the colonies that maintained black majorities.  The slaves employed 
were not to be paid and were required to return their arms after the conflict, but would in fact 
gain their emancipation, with the owners compensated for loss of their property.49  
John Laurens also served on a board that concluded the hesitancy of South Carolina to 
form a proper, white militia. He noted that “the great proportion of citizens [found it] necessary 
to remain at home and prevent insurrections among the Negroes.”50 However, Laurens 
contended, prevention of insurrection was not needed because slaves would not assume the 
agency to take advantage of American distraction, and seek freedom, apart from British 
agitation. Writing to his plantation owning father, John Laurens stated that: 
 
 the minds of this unhappy species [are] much debased by a Servitude from which they 
can hope for no Relief but Death – and that every motive to action but Fear, must be so 
nearly extinguished in them… their Self-Love… so totally annihilated as not frequently 
to induce ardent wishes for change. 51 
 
John Laurens, despite his father’s status as one of the most prominent South Carolina slave 
owners, was an ardent supporter of the use of slaves as soldiers and further on in the same letter 
                                                          
49  Douglas R. Egerton, Death or Liberty: African Americans and Revolutionary America (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 83.                             
50  “Congressional Session 29 March 1779,” in Livermore, An Historical Research, 133-134.                       
51  John Laurens to Henry Laurens, The Papers of Henry Laurens, vol. 12, 391.      
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even suggested that their "Habits of Subordination" would make them ideal for military service. 
Young Laurens also expressed even more radical views there, suggesting that offering 
emancipation to slaves that agreed to serve in the military would be appropriate, as they would 
not become overwhelmed or rash enough to attempt turning against their former masters.  
Asking his father’s opinion, John Laurens posed the question: 
 
  When can [emancipation] be better done, than when their enfranchisement may 
be made conducive to the public good, and be modified, as not to overpower their 
weak minds?52  
 
The query illustrated the prevailing understanding that black slaves were intellectually inferior to 
whites, unable to even understand what freedom would mean, and that the freedom the American 
military offered could be modified to suit their desires.  
John Laurens and many others were “tempted to believe that this trampled people 
(slaves)… [Were] capable of aspiring to rights of men by noble exertions, if some friend to 
mankind would point the Road,” but thought that slaves would never have had the mental 
capacity to aspire to or claim freedom without outside, white-based, provocation or support to 
guide them.53 However, the “friend to mankind” that would guide slaves into freedom was 
infinitely important to the contenders for the title. This group would maintain the ability to lead 
                                                          
52  John Laurens to Henry Laurens, February 1778, in The Army Correspondence of Colonel John Laurens, in the 
Years 1777-8, Now First Printed from Original Letters Addressed to His Father, Henry Laurens, President of 
Congress, with a Memoir, ed. William Gilmore Simms (New York: Bradford Club, 1867) 117. 
53  Ibid., 117. 
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the slaves against their enemies and, most importantly, to shape “freedom” to their own 
purposes. Because of this, the American rebels’ primary goal in utilizing slaves was to counter 
the British attempts to incite and to define the freedom slaves that joined them would receive 
after the war. This was the basis for Henry Lauren’s fundamental aversion to his son’s plan, 
noting that those slaves that received emancipation would really gain little more than a different 
version of white control, a tightly circumscribed freedom under the guise of true liberty. The 
Patriots most deeply feared what the British might do with the ability to control free black men 
and women, using a broadly defined freedom as a bribe to persuade slaves to act out against 
former masters.  
Along with the need for manpower, another relevant reason slaves were eventually 
employed by the Americans was that it allowed them to keep the strongest and most determined 
slaves from fighting for the British and further inciting their fellow slaves. This echoed British 
employment of the strongest slaves, most able to overtake those who were in control, in non-
combat positions.  In a resolution made by the Continental Congress in 1779, because there was 
a “great danger from the endeavors of the enemy to excite (slaves), either to revolt or to desert,” 
it was: 
 
 suggested by the delegates of the said State (South Carolina) … that a force might be 
raised in the said State from among the negroes which would not only be formidable to 
the enemy from their numbers and the discipline of which they would very readily admit, 
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but would also lessen the danger from revolts and desertions by detaching the most 
vigorous and enterprising from among the negroes. 54 
 
To further keep slaves in their place within the strict social hierarchy and to counter British 
recruitment tactics, American forces offered some white recruits nearing the end of the war “the 
bounty of ‘one sound Negro’ between the ages of ten and forty,” for each year of service 
performed.55The most important element of this offer to note was that it did not specify which 
African Americans would be provided to white soldiers following the war, implying that either 
former Loyalist or Patriot owned slaves could be returned to servitude.  
 
In the end, according to estimates made by historians, South Carolina lost near a quarter 
of the slaves they held before the Revolution, which left a majority of the slave population where 
they had been before the war.56 Though a number took advantage of distracted white masters to  
run away to freedom individually, or allied with British or American militaries, most stayed put.  
At the end of the war, many American plantation owners marveled at this, including the 
prominent slave owner and Charleston resident, Charles Pinckney. During a debate in the United 
States House of Representatives in 1820, Pinckney stated that: 
 
                                                          
54  Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, ed. Worthington C. Ford et al. (Washington, D.C., 1904-1937), 
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55  Ibid.       
56  Morgan, Slave Counterpoint, 666; Nash’s The Forgotten Fifth and Walker’s The Black Loyalists indicate that one 
fifth of the entire colonial pre-war slave population was used on behalf of the British and another fifth by the 
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It is a most remarkable fact, that notwithstanding, in the course of the Revolution, the 
Southern States were continually overrun by the British, and that every negro in them had 
an opportunity of leaving their owners, few did; proving thereby not only a most 
remarkable attachment to their owners, but the mildness of the treatment, from whence 
their affection sprang.57  
 
Pinckney held that slaves stayed put out of loyalty, and because they were not mistreated by their 
owners, providing them no logical reason to leave. Pinckney was not the only American to 
believe slaves stayed put to reflect their affection for their white owners. In a lengthy letter to his 
son, Henry Laurens wrote “My Negroes there [in South Carolina,] all to a man, are strongly 
attached to me… hitherto not one of them has attempted to desert.” 58 American slave owners 
held up a misconception that attributed lack of slave uprising to personal loyalty, even affection, 
toward their masters, when in fact, reasons slaves had for staying put that were substantially 
more complex.     
 One practical reason why slaves did not rise up was limited mobility Leaving after a 
successful rebellion, or even getting one off of the ground, was made increasing difficult by the 
poverty experienced by the enslaved, and the rest of the population, as agriculture was 
diminished with farmers and planters distracted by the war. 59  Slaves remaining on plantations 
were left with little food or other supplies, especially on plantations that had been plundered by 
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58  Henry Laurens, A South Carolina Protest Against Slavery: Being a Letter from Henry Laurens, Second President 
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British soldiers, and found it more beneficial to stay in one place to take advantage of what the 
British did leave behind. In writing a letter to his master, Henry Laurens, literate slave Samuel 
Massey explained what the Revolution was like at the South Carolina plantation Laurens owned, 
Mepkin, to which he belonged. Though he made note of several slaves that were taken by the 
British and several from another nearby plantation, Smalls, that volunteered to support the 
British, he states that slaves were willing to stay put when crops were thriving: “Those at mepkin 
are all for staying at Home as Both your feild and thaer oan are in a flurishing way.”60  Though 
Massey went on to list the numerous things that the British plundered, including personal effects 
of both Henry and John Laurens, horses, and other belongings, the British did not take away 
slaves’ ability to use plantation fields to their advantage. This reason for staying on their 
plantations starkly contrasts with white beliefs, providing a more logical and though less 
idealized explanation of unthinking loyalty to their masters. Given the knowledge of growing 
rice and other crops, as well as the relative freedom many slaves held in  South Carolina planting 
positions, many were motivated to stay and continue to grow crops, a much desired commodity 
for both American and British militaries. This allowed slaves a means to become self-sustaining. 
Virtually free from white control during the war, slaves had no need to revolt, or to join either 
military, hoping that things would stay the same way following the conflict. With the only 
seemingly guaranteed roads to legal freedom likely to end in tragedy or death, running away, 
joining military forces, or staging an uprising seemed unnecessary due to the lack of either 
British or American oppression on the majority of slaves in South Carolina throughout the war. It 
was not for lack of intelligence or desire to revolt for freedom that kept slaves from uprising 
during the war, but instead logistical circumstances and self-preservation tactics. 
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 Another reason slaves stayed put was highlighted in Henry Laurens’ response to his son’s 
letter about his desire to employ slaves in the American military. The elder Laurens chastised 
John, emphasizing how there was no guarantee that freed blacks would accept military roles: 
 
You will not be of your own opinion after a little reflection— ‘tis evident… that 
you have not digested a Plan—admitting… you have a right to remove a Man 
from one state of Slavery into another—of if you please into a state of servitude 
which will be esteemed by him infinitely worse than Slavery… upon what ground 
of justice will you insist upon their inlisting for Soldiers as the condition of their 
infranchisement?61 
Henry Laurens here indicated that often, serving in the military could simply become a different, 
and perhaps even more brutal, form of slavery, as was also indicated in the writing of Boston 
King. Surprisingly, Henry Laurens, despite his ownership of large numbers of slaves, believed 
that freedom should be bestowed on African Americans without any form of exchange, arguing 
that if his son planned to employ slaves, he should “set them at full liberty—and then approach 
them in the Language of a recruiting Officer to any other free Men” to verify that they truly wish 
to support the Patriot cause and to uphold the honorable gentlemanly integrity American 
ideology held dear.62 Though Henry Laurens argued that ultimately few slaves would then join 
the military, he is one of very few white men of the era, American or British, to acknowledge 
slaves in terms of their potential thoughts and aspirations toward military service and ultimately 
toward freedom, as opposed to simply physical terms. 
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 Today, many Americans shudder to think of the dark shadow that slavery casts on 
America’s national history, avoiding it whenever possible. Especially in referring back to a time 
when adored American heroes like George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison, 
and British villains, like Lord Cornwallis, were written into the legacy of the American 
Revolution, it is easy to ignore Morgan’s “radio static,” ever present in the historical 
background, but obscured by misunderstanding of those in power creating the records. Hidden 
from the limelight, the struggle for slaves toward freedom is largely overshadowed by the 
inflated tales of epic battles for Patriot liberty from the hated Redcoats and America’s heroic 
triumph over enslavement. As is evident on closer inspection, though perhaps on a lower 
frequency, the fear slave freedom was even more deeply embedded than the emphatic fear that 
“the British were coming!”  It was this terror that made the war in South Carolina so unique, a 
battle of two white giants with their own agendas using a hopeful black slave population as a 
weapon against their enemy, promising freedom in their own terms, but often times going back 
on their word. The greatest tragedy was the widely held convention of the British and Americans 
that slaves lacked the capacity to aspire to freedom on their own or to attempt to assume the 
agency required to pursue it. For the British, slaves were simply an ignorant resource to be 
utilized and controlled as a weapon to put down the American insurrection. The British dangled a 
confined liberty before slaves, without acknowledging the value of slave humanity beyond their 
use against the Patriots. Perhaps even worse, for the Americans the fear of slave rebellion was 
more directly a fear of British intervention, their political maneuvering being the only factor 
considered that would make revolt ultimately likely. It was due to this that Americans decided to 
employ slaves as a means to maintain control over them, even if they had to grant partial 
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“freedom” to counter the British. In their confrontation, both the British and the American forces 
built safeguards against revolt to prevent each other from gaining the advantage, all the while 
keeping slaves from attaining any form of upward mobility and further excluding them from the 
benefits of liberty and equality for decades following.  
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